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NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PRESUMPTION OF DEPENDENCY BY
WIDow-Deceased abandoned his wife about two years before he
was killed in defendant's employment. Although he continued to
visit her from time to time, there was no evidence of a continuance
of the conjugal relationship. Decedent contributed nothing to the
support of the plaintiff, but used his entire income to support a con-
cubine. Held, plaintiff's demand for benefit payments rejected'
upon finding that she was neither "living with" nor actually de-
pendent upon the deceased within the contemplation of the Work-
men's Compensation Act.2 Slaughter v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, 33 So. (2d) 86 (La. 1947).
Persons eligible for benefits under Section 8, Subsection 2, are
divided into those conclusively presumed dependent and those who
must show actual dependency.' A wife "living with" her husband
at the time of the accident and death is conclusively presumed to
be dependent upon him. Once this presumption is established, she
is relieved from the necessity of proving actual dependency and
receives the entire quota of compensation allowable to a widow.
If it is necessary to prove actual dependency, however, she must
show the extent to which she was dependent upon the deceased and
compensation will be awarded proportionate to that part of the
deceased husband's wage which has been contributed to her sup-
port.' Obviously, it is to the widow's advantage that she be ad-
judged to have been "living with" her husband within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In conformity with the policy of our law to favor permanence
of the martial institution,5 the cases reveal a definite tendency on
the part of the courts to find a "living with" wherever possible.
They have consistently held that a mere physical separation is not
sufficient to deprive the widow of the presumption established in
her favor.' Courts of other jurisdictions have made similar find-
1. Factors enumerated as controlling were "the fact of living apart for a
time, coupled with the determination by the husband to preserve that status,
plus the failure on his part to render support for his wife. . . " This decision
is in agreement with those of Moy v. Schuylkill Products Co., 209 La. 782,
25 So. (2d) 542 (1946) (which presented a set of facts substantially similar
to those in the case at bar) and Haynes v. Loffland Bros. Co., La. App.
[Orl.] Docket No. 18,786 (March 1, 1948).
2. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(2)(A), (D), (K), as amended by La. Act 242
of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4398].
3. Bradley v. Swift & Co., 167 La. 249, 119 So. 37 (1928).
4. Supra note 2.
5. Arts. 89, 120, 139, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Oliphant v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 521 (1927);
Books v. Keen & Woolf Oil Co., 120 So. 99 (La. App. 1928); Laurent v.
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*ings.7 Yet, where there has been an obvious severance of the marital
relation, particularly in situations involving moral turpitude on the
part of the claimant, recovery is usually denied.' Disruption of con-
jugal relations by mutual consent has been deemed to destroy the
presumption of dependency.9 However, in the light of our public
policy as reflected in the jurisprudence, that rule would seem to
apply only to voluntary separations in which there was a mutual
acknowledgment of incompatibility and mutual intent to sever the
marital bonds permanently. In other cases the courts have con-
sidered the particular situation to determine whether the necessary
factors which would warrant the finding of a "living with" were
present. In this inquiry, the courts have been primarily concerned
with evidence of financial support by the deceased,' ° the frequency
and nature of his visits," the couple's status in the public eye, 2 and
the cause for the separation." Where the separation has resulted
from economic necessity, there has been a decided effort to find
either a "living with" or actual dependency. 4
In the case at bar, the court expressed regret that it was possible
for a husband to deprive his wife of the benefits of the Workmen's
Dendinger, Inc., 126 So. 600 (La. App. 1930); Harris v. Louisiana Oil Refining
Corp. 127 So. 40 (La. App. 1930); Robinson v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 191
So. 145 (La. App. 1939).
7. Northwestern Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wis., 154 Wis. 97,
142 N. W. 271 (1913); in re Nelson, 217 Mass. 467, 105 N. E. 357 (1914);
Bullman v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 144 Neb. 342, 13 N. W. (2d)
403 (1944).
8. Knox v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co., 138 So. 189 (La. App. 1931);
Rollins v. Foundation Co., 154 So. 674 (La. App. 1934); Gloston v. Industrial
Lumber Co., Inc., 159 So. 618 (La. App. 1935); Woodard v. Murphy Iron &
Boiler Works, 172 So. 397 (La. App. 1937).
9. Milton v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 165 La. 386, 115 So. 582 (1928), where,
although the plaintiff and deceased were separated only three or four months,
the court found no "living with," emphasizing the fact that the plaintiff
acquiesced in the abandonment; Zuviceh v. Schnyder, 137 So. 379 (La. App. 1931).
10. See Oliphant v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 521
(1927); Books v. Keen & Woolf Oil Co., 120 So. 99 (La. App. 1928); Keyhea
v. Woodard-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830 (La. App. 1933); Dupree v.
Monroe Sand & Gravel Co., 18 So. (2d) 845 (La. App. 1943).
11. See Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339 (La. App.
1935); Ross v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 168 So. 353 (La. App. 1936); Robinson
v. Standard Oil of La., 191 So. 145 (La. App. 1939); Moy v. Schuylkill Products
Co., 209 La. 782, 25 So. (2d) 542 (1946).
12. See Harris v. La. Oil Refining Corp., 127 So. 40 (La. App.
1930); Ross v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 168 So. 353 (La. App. 1936).
13. See Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339 (La. App.
1935) ; McCaskill v. Lyon Lumber Co., 154 So. 479 (La. App. 1934); American
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Sanders, 177 So. 498 (La. App. 1937).
14. Books v. Keen & Woolf Oil Co., 120 So. 99 (La. App. 1928); Harris
v. La. Oil Refining Corp., 127 So. 40 (La. App. 1930); Fulton Bag &
Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 839 (La. App. 1935), where the court ruled
that so long as plaintiff could reasonably expect the deceased to return, just
so long did she remain a dependent wife.
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Compensation' Act by merely abandoning his marital duties. This
same attitude was manifested in Moy v. Schuylkill Products Com-
pany. 5 However, in both cases the courts recognized that any
remedy in this situation rested exclusively within the sphere of legis-
lative action."
The present state of the law is unsatisfactory.
As the result of the death of her husband, the plaintiff has lost
not only the right to institute proceedings to compel support, but
also the opportunity to effect a reconciliation. In cases where the
plaintiff has spent a long period of service as a housewife, she will
probably experience a difficult period of readjustment, during which
time part of her support must necessarily come from other sources.
In this period she may be further handicapped by parental obliga-
tions. From the standpoint of domestic economy and social policy,
she still represents a part of the marital institution. Thus, aside from
the purely moral aspect, practical considerations call for legislative
action to prevent the continued perpetration of this injustice.
FRED W. JONES
15. See note 1, supra.
16. 33 So. (2d) 86, 88 (La. 1947).
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